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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)Q). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE No. 1 
Should this Court affirm the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law because Mr. and Mrs. Gomez failed to marshal the evidence as required by 
Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and applicable appellate case 
law? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR ISSUE No. 1 
The trial court's Findings of Fact are subject to a clearly erroneous standard 
of review. Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states, "Findings of 
fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless 
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial 
court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." (Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a)). An 
appellate court "will not reverse the findings of fact of a trial court sitting without 
a jury unless they are . . . clearly erroneous." (Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 
1256 (Utah 1998); citations omitted) The "clearly erroneous" standard applies 
whether the case is one in equity or one at law. (Baker vs. Francis, 741 P.2d 548 
(UtahCtApp. 1987)) 
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ISSUE No. 2 
Were the trial court's Finding of Fact correct that the four-year statute of 
limitations started to run on October 27, 2004, when Ms. Deakin learned for the 
first time in 28 years that Mr. Gomes was going to sell the house and thus, take 
action inconsistent with his gift of the duplex to her? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR ISSUE No. 2 
The trial court's Findings of Fact are subject to questions of law, fact, and a 
clearly erroneous standard of review. (Spears vs. Warr, 44 P.3d 742, 753 (Utah 
2002)). 'The applicability of a statute of limitations and the applicability of the 
discovery rule are questions of law, which [are] review[ed] for correctness. 
However, the applicability of the statute of limitations and the discovery rule also 
involves a subsidiary factual determination - the point at which a person 
reasonably should know that he or she has suffered a legal injury. This is a 
question of fact. Accordingly, we review for correctness, incorporating a clearly 
erroneous standard of review for the subsidiary factual determination of when the 
plaintiffs should have known of their alleged legal injuries." (Spears vs. Warr, 44 
P.3d 742, 753 (Utah 2002); citations omitted) 
ISSUE No. 3 
Did the trial court correctly find that Ms. Deakin had actual, adverse, 
exclusive, open, notorious, visible, continuous, and undisturbed possession for a 
period of greater than seven-years and that she has continuously paid the property 
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taxes for the property for 28 years, and that she has made and paid for all 
improvements to the property for more than seven-years? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR ISSUE No. 3 
The trial court's Findings of Fact are subject to a clearly erroneous standard 
of review. Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states, "Findings of 
fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless 
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial 
court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." (Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a)). An 
appellate court "will not reverse the findings of fact of a trial court sitting without 
a jury unless they are . . . clearly erroneous." (Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 
1256 (Utah 1998); citations omitted) The "clearly erroneous" standard applies 
whether the case is one in equity or one at law. (Baker vs. Francis, 741 P.2d 548 
(UtahCt.App. 1987)) 
DETERMINATIVE RULES AND STATUTES 
Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires the Appellant to 
marshal all the evidence in its argument section. Failure to marshal the evidence 
requires a dismissal of the appeal. 
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth that the Findings 
of Fact shall not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous. 
The relevant statute of limitations is four-years pursuant to U.C.A. §78-12-
25. 
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The relevant statures for adverse possession are U.C.A. §78-12-5 to §78-
12- 14. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This a dispute over ownership of a duplex located in Salt Lake City, Utah 
that was gifted by Mr. Gomez to Ms. Deakin in 1977. More specifically, Ms. 
Deakin's action was to quiet title to the property in Ms. Deakin through theories of 
adverse possession, unjust enrichment, detrimental reliance/promissory estoppel, 
fraud, interference with contract and contempt of court. After granting a 
Temporary Restraining Order and a Preliminary Injunction, the trial court held a 
one-day bench trial. Following the trial, the trail court ruled that Ms. Deakin met 
the all the elements to prevail on her claims of adverse possession and detrimental 
reliance/promissory estoppel, thus, quieting title in her. (R. 314-325) 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
On November 8, 2004, Ms. Deakin, through counsel, filed her original 
Complaint to Quiet Title. (R. 1-11) On November 9, 2004, Ms. Deakin filed with 
the trial court a Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order, with accompanying 
memorandum and affidavit, pursuant to Rule 65 A of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. (R. 20-26, 30-47) On November 9, 2004, Ms. Deakin also filed an 
Amended Lis Pendis Notice with the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office and a 
copy with the trial court. (R. 17-19) 
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The Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order sought to restrain Mr. 
Gomez from selling the real estate in question and from evicting Ms. Deakin and 
her tenant from the premises until the trial court had adjudicated the Compliant. 
(R. 31) Mr. Gomez's attorney was personally served with the motion, 
memorandum, and affidavit for a Temporary Restraining Order. (R. 33, 44) On 
November 10, 2004, Mr. Gomez's attorney filed his Memorandum in Opposition 
to the Temporary Restraining Order. (R. 27-29) 
On November 10, 2004, the trial court heard oral argument and granted Ms. 
Deakin's Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order pursuant to Rule 65 A of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. 48-50; see also Addendum, Exhibit 1 to 
Appellee's Brief) The trial court restrained Mr. Gomez from evicting Ms. Deakin 
from the property and from selling the property (Id.) Mr. Gomez was ordered to 
appear before the trial court on November 22, 2004 for a preliminary injunction 
hearing. (R. 50; see also Addendum, Exhibit 1 and 2 to Appellee's Brief) 
On November 18, 2004, Mr. Gomez filed a Motion to Dismiss with an 
accompanying memorandum. (R. 54-59) Ms. Deakin filed a Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. (R. 91-106) In his Motion to 
Dismiss, Mr. Gomez argued that Ms. Deakin's claim to quiet title was barred by 
the four-year statute of limitations as set forth in Utah Code. Ann. §78-12-25 - the 
same argument Mr. and Mrs. Gomez assert in this appeal. (R. 55-58; see 
Appellant's Brief 3, 6-9) Mr. Gomez also presented a statute of frauds argument in 
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his Motion to Dismiss; however, the trial denied the statute of frauds argument 
when it denied the Motion to Dismiss. (R. 55-58, 91-106, 120) 
The trial court denied Mr. Gomez's Motion to Dismiss finding that the 
statute of limitations did not commence to run until October 27, 2004, the date Mr. 
Gomez first put Ms. Deakin on notice of his intent to sell the property. (R. 120, 
317, 320, 324; see Transcript of Preliminary Injunction Hearing p. 111-115; see 
also Addendum Exhibit 2) The trial court found that Mr. Gomez admitted that 
Ms. Deakin did not receive any notice of a legal injury prior to October 27, 2004. 
(R. 319,320, 324) 
On November 22, 2004, the trial court held the Preliminary Injunction 
Hearing pursuant to Rule 65A of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. 72-74) 
Ms. Deakin and her attorney were present. (Id.) Mr. Gomez failed to appear for 
the hearing though he was ordered by the trial court to appear. (R. 55-58, 72-74) 
Mr. Gomez's attorney was present at the hearing. (Id.) Pursuant to Rule 65A of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the trial court heard testimony and received 
documentary evidence. (Transcript of Preliminary Injunction Hearing; see also 
Addendum Exhibits 2 and 3). 
The trial court heard the testimony of Ms. Deakin and Mr. Ed Aho stating 
Mr. Gomez had gifted the property to Ms. Deakin, and she had openly and 
adversely held the property for the more than seven years. (R. 72-74; see 
Transcript of Preliminary Injunction Hearing p. 111-115; see also Addendum, 
Exhibit 2) The trial court also received documentary evidence showing Ms. 
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Deakin had paid the taxes, paid the mortgage payments, and paid for all 
improvements to the property for the past 28 years. (R. 72-74; see Transcript of 
Preliminary Injunction Hearing p. 111-115; see also Addendum Exhibits 2, 3, and 
4) On November 22, 2004, the trial court granted Ms. Deakin's Preliminary 
Injunction and the matter was set for trail. (R. 72-74; Transcript of Preliminary 
Injunction Hearing) 
During the course of this case, the Complaint and the Answer were 
amended several times by stipulation. (R. 114-115, 148-169, 210-233, 245-248) 
Mr. and Mrs. Gomez did not attend any of the pre-trial hearings in this 
matter. (R. 72-74, 314) 
On February 25, 2005, this matter came before the trial court for a bench 
trial. (R. 314) Ms. Deakin and her attorney and Mr. Gomez and his attorney were 
present at the trial. (R. 314) Mrs. Gomez failed to appear at the trial. (R. 314) All 
of the evidence and testimony admitted at the respective Temporary Restraining 
Order and Preliminary Injunction hearings were admitted for the purpose of the 
bench trial pursuant to Rule 65 A of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. 314) 
After hearing and receiving the parties' stipulations of fact and hearing the 
testimony of various witnesses, and receiving evidence, the trial court found in 
favor of Ms. Deakin on her claims of adverse possession and detrimental 
reliance/promissory estoppel. (R. 314-325) The trial court quieted title to the 
property to Ms. Deakin. (R. 306, 314-325; see Addendum Exhibits 5 and 6) 
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C. DISPOSITION OF TRIAL COURT 
On April 5, 2005, the trial court issued its initial Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Order quieting title to the property to Ms. Deakin (R. 
264-277) The trial court specifically found that Ms. Deakin had prevailed on her 
claim for quiet title by adverse possession and her claim of detrimental 
reliance/promissory estoppel. (R. 264-277) 
On April 15, 2005, Mr. Gomez, through counsel, filed a Motion to Amend 
Findings of Fact with an accompanying memorandum. (R. 285-291) In his 
Motion to Amend the Findings of Fact, Mr. Gomez asked the trial court to add a 
findings that the Statute of Limitations defense raised in Defendants5 pleadings 
was denied based upon detrimental reliance by Plaintiff (R. 285) Ms. Deakin 
opposed the Motion to Amend arguing that the trial court had already denied the 
defendants' the Statute of Limitations argument and ruled on the issue three 
different times - at the Preliminary Injunction hearing, the denial of the Motion to 
Dismiss, and at trial. (R. 292-297; see also R. 120, 317, 320, 324; see Transcript 
of Preliminary Injunction Hearing p. 111-115; see also Addendum) The trial court 
consistently ruled that the Statute of Limitations did not start to run until October 
27, 2004. (Id.) Ms. Deakin also argued that Mr. Gomez was preparing for an 
appeal by requesting the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law be amended. 
(R. 292-297) 
On June 3, 2005, the Court heard oral argument on the Motion to Amend. 
(R. 314) The trial court granted the Motion to Amend, and the trial court amended 
8 
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on June 3, 2005 to include a 
statement on the Statute of Limitations commencing to run on October 27, 2004. 
(R. 314-325) The trial court's unpublished opinion can be found on pages 314-
325 of the record as well as a copy of the June 3, 2005 Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law is included in the Addendum hereto as Exhibit 6. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
From 1973 to 1993, Mr. Gomez engaged in a prolonged romantic 
relationship with Ms. Deakin while he was married to Ramona Gomez. (R. 316, 
Admitted Facts 319, 320; see also Transcript of Preliminary Injunction Hearing) 
Mr. Gomez gave Ms. Deakin a number of expensive gifts during their 20 year 
relationship, including two automobiles, a ring, love letters, and a duplex. (R. 314, 
320) In 1976, Mr. Gomez told Ms. Deakin that he wanted to improve her living 
conditions so she could have a better quality of life. (R. Admitted Facts 319) 
In 1977, Mr. Gomez bought a duplex located at 468 E. and 470 E. Sherman 
Ave., Salt Lake City, Utah, as a gift for Ms. Deakin (R. 316) In April 1977, Mr. 
Gomez gave Ms. Deakin the keys to the duplex, and he gave her possession and 
exclusive control of the duplex. (R. 316) Ms. Deakin testified that Mr. Gomez 
told her the house was hers, and she could do with it as she chose. (R. 316) When 
Mr. Gomez gave Ms. Deakin the keys, possession, and exclusive control of the 
duplex, he told her to pay the mortgage to the mortgage company, to pay the taxes 
through the mortgage escrow account, to pay for all of the improvements, to pay 
for all of the utility bills, and so forth. (R. 316) 
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Sometime after 1977, Mr. Gomez added his wife, Ramona Gomez, to the 
Certificate of Title. (R. 316) Though Ms. Deakin states that the Certificate of Title 
speaks for itself, neither Mr. nor Mrs. Gomez offered a copy of the Certificate of 
Title or a copy of the Mortgage or any such evidence at trial proving that they are 
in fact the recorded titleholders of the property in question. (R. 316) Mr. and Mrs. 
Gomez did not submit any evidence to the trial court which would indicate that 
Mrs. Gomez's name was placed on the title at any time or that she ever took any 
action in the property. (R. 316) 
Since 1977, Ms. Deakin has acted consistently with her position as owner 
of the property in regard to paying the mortgage, the taxes, the improvements, and 
the utility bills. (R. 317, 320, 321) For 28 years, Ms. Deakin has relied on Mr. 
Gomez's commitment and statements that the property was hers. (R. 317) She 
believed in good faith that Mr. Gomez had given the property to her. (R. 321) 
For nearly 28 years, Ms. Deakin has leased the other half of the duplex to 
tenants v/ithout any restraint, objections, or requirements from Mr. or Mrs. 
Gomez. (R. Admitted Facts 319) Mr. Gomez admitted that he has never been in 
any lease agreement with Ms. Deakin or any tenant to the property. (R. Admitted 
Facts 319) Neither Mr. nor Mrs. Gomez has ever asked or required Ms. Deakin 
for an accounting of the collected rents, the mortgage payments, the tax payments, 
or the improvements or to make the payments to them. (R. 317, R. Admitted Facts 
319-320) 
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Ms. Deakin is an unsophisticated, uninformed, and inexperienced person 
when it comes to real estate. (R. 316) Nonetheless, Ms. Deakin asked Mr. Gomez 
numerous times for him to put the title of the duplex in her name as he had 
promised. (R. 317) Each time she followed up with him, Mr. Gomez would say, 
"I'll get around to it, babe, I'll get around to it." (R. 317; see Transcript of 
Preliminary Injunction Hearing, p. 11-115; see also Addendum Exhibit 2) Ms. 
Deakin has never made such requests in writing because she relied on Mr. 
Gomez's promise that he would get around to putting title in to her name. (R. 317) 
The parties did not consider a formal deed to be essential to completing the gift. 
(R. 317) 
For 28 years, Ms. Deakin has paid for all of the improvements to the 
property. (R. 316-322) She has made and paid for the following improvements to 
the duplex: new roof, new water/sewer main line, new back porch and railings, 
tore down garages, new 220 volt electrical wiring, new air conditioning units, new 
water heaters, new light fixtures, new ceiling fans, new carpet, several costs of 
new paint, new storm doors, several new stoves, several new refrigerators, and 
new pipes and drains for clothes washers. (R. 318) The trial court received into 
evidence that Ms. Deakin paid for these repairs. (R. 318) Ms. Deakin never 
requested permission from Mr. Gomez to do any of these repairs, because she 
relied on his statements that the property was hers. (R. 318) On one occasion, Ms. 
Deakin did ask Mr. Gomez for financial assistance for a repair, but he refused 
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because he told her that the house was hers and she could do with it as she pleased. 
(R.318) 
Mr. Gomez testified to the following: He did not pay for any of the 
improvements to the house listed above. (R. Admitted Facts 319., 320) He did not 
know that the garages had been torn down within the past ten years. (R. 320; Trial 
Transcript p. 55) He has not paid for, known of, or made any improvements to the 
house for the past ten years. (R. 320, Trial Transcript p. 55) He did not even know 
that the locks to the house had been changed. (Trial Transcript p. 55-57) He has 
not visited the property within the past ten years. (R. 320, Trial Transcript p. 55) 
Since 1977, Ms. Deakin has paid all of the taxes on the property. (R. 317, 
321) Mr. Gomez admitted that neither he nor Mrs. Gomez ever paid the property 
taxes for the duplex. (R. 316-318, R. Admitted Facts 319, R. 320) Mr. Gomez 
admitted that all mortgage payments and tax notices have been sent to 468 E. 
Sherman Ave., where Ms. Deakin resides. (R. Admitted Facts 319) 
For 28 years, Ms. Deakin has relied on Mr. Gomez's commitment and 
statements that the property was hers. (R. 317) She believed in good faith that 
Mr. Gomez had given the property to her. (R. 321) Ms. Deakin has paid all the 
mortgage payments, improvements, and taxes for 28 years. (R. 316-321) Mr. and 
Mrs. Gomez have never possessed or occupied the property in question. (R. 
Admitted Facts 319) Ms. Deakin never heard anything contrary to Mr. Gomez's 
commitment that the property was hers until October 27, 2004 when Mr. Gomez's 
real estate agent abruptly informed Ms. Deakin he was selling the property. (R. 
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317) This was the first action inconsistent with Mr. Gomez's gift of the property. 
(R.317) 
Mr. Gomez admitted that prior to October 27, 2004, he had not informed 
Ms. Deakin that he was going to sell the property. (R. Admitted Facts 319, 320) 
Mr. Gomez admitted that Ms. Deakin did not receive any notice of legal injury 
prior to October 27, 2004. (R. Admitted Facts 319, 320) 
The trial court found: 
Based on all of the evidence and the Court's evaluation 
of the demeanor and credibility of Plaintiff and 
Defendant Mr. Gomez on the witness stand, the Court 
further finds based on clear, convincing, and 
unequivocal evidence, that in the context of Defendant 
Mr. Gomez's actions, the extended relationship of the 
parties, the statements made to Plaintiff by Defendant 
Mr. Gomez in April 1977 and thereafter, and 
Plaintiffs consistent behavior for 28 years, Defendant 
did make a gift of the property to the Plaintiff in April 
1977 and the Plaintiff reasonably believed in good 
faith that such a gift had been made, and Plaintiff acted 
in good faith reliance upon that belief. Moreover, 
acting upon her belief that such a gift had been made, 
the Plaintiff made valuable, substantial, and beneficial 
improvements to the property along with paying the 
costs of such improvements and paying the mortgage 
on the property for 28 years. Further, the Court finds, 
that revoking the gift or rescinding the gift at this time 
would be inequitable to the parties, and specifically to 
Plaintiff who, for 28 years has detrimentally relied 
upon her good faith belief that a gift was made to her 
by Defendant Mr. Gomez. (R. 321-322) 
13 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
First, this Court should affirm the trial court's Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law because the Appellants failed to marshal the evidence as 
required by Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and applicable 
appellate case law. Mr. and Mrs. Gomez have not marshaled the evidence to 
demonstrate why the trial court's specific finding that the statute of limitations 
began to run on October 27, 2004 was in error. Furthermore, Appellants have not 
marshaled any evidence to explain why the trial court's findings and conclusions 
that Ms. Deakin met the statutory and case law elements for quiet title and adverse 
possession should be reversed. 
Second, this Court should affirm the trial court's finding that the statute of 
limitations commenced to run on October 27, 2004. In Appellant's brief, Mr. and 
Mrs. Gomez do not give any reasons, cite to any evidence, or cite to any detailed 
finding of fact to support their claim that all the elements to prove a cause of 
action were present in 1978. Mr. Gomez completely ignores his admission that 
prior to October 27, 2004, he had not informed Ms. Deakin that he was going to 
sell the house. For 28 years, she detrimentally relied on his statements that the 
house was hers. Since 1977, she acted consistently with Mr. Gomez's statements 
that she was responsible to pay for the mortgage, the taxes, the utilities, and all 
improvements to the property. Neither Mr. nor Mrs. Gomez gave Ms. Deakin any 
notice of legal injury prior to October 27, 2004. 
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Third, this Court should affirm the trial court's findings and conclusions 
that Ms. Deakin has met the statutory and case law elements for quiet title and 
adverse possession. She has shown that in 1993, Mr. Gomez ended their 
relationship. Since 1993, she has had actual, adverse, exclusive, open, notorious, 
visible, continuous, and undisturbed possession for a period of seven-years or 
greater. She has continuously paid the property taxes on the property during a 
period exceeding seven-years, and she has made and paid for all improvements to 
the property. 
For the reasons stated above, this Court should affirm the trial court's 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
ARGUMENT 
ISSUE No. 1 
MR. AND MRS. GOMEZ FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE AS 
REQUIRED BY RULE 24 OF THE UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE 
PROCEDURE AND APPLICABLE APPELLATE CASE LAW TO 
DEMONSTRATE THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW SHOULD BE REVERSED. THUS, 
APPELLANTS' APPEAL MUST FAIL, AND THE FINDINGS AFFIRMED. 
If the appellant has not met the marshalling requirement, the appellate court 
is required to affirm that the Findings of Fact are correct, and the appeal must fail. 
(Valcarce vs. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d305, 312 (Utah 1998); see also Johnson vs. 
ffigley, 989 P.2d 61, 72 (Utah Ct. App. 1999)). The trial court's Findings of Fact 
must be affirmed and this appeal must fail because Mr. and Mrs. Gomez did not 
marshal the evidence to demonstrate why the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
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Law are clearly erroneous. There are clear procedural requirements outlined in the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and 
applicable case law for marshalling the evidence. 
Rule 24(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate procedure states: 
[t]he brief of the appellant shall contain under 
appropriate headings and in the order indicated: 
(a)(9) An Argument. The argument shall contain the 
contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect 
to the issues presented ... A party challenging a fact 
finding must first marshal all record evidence that 
supports the challenged finding. 
(Utah R. App. P. 24(a)) 
This Court has held that the appellant must clearly marshal the evidence in 
the "argument section" of appellant's brief. (Fitzgerald vs. Critchfield, 744 P.2d 
301, 304 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)) "To comply with the marshalling requirement, 
appellants must marshal all the favorable evidence at the point at which they 
challenge the factual finding." (Roderick vs. Ricks, 54 P.3d 1119 (Utah 2002)) 
The marshalling requirement, which is to be found in the argument section of the 
brief, is "neither elective nor optional." (Fitzgerald vs. Critchfield, 744 P.2d 301, 
304 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)) 
The marshalling requirement entails a "listing [of[ all the evidence 
supporting the finding that is challenged. Once the evidence is listed ... with 
appropriate citations to the record, the appellant must then show that the 
marshaled evidence is legally insufficient to support the findings . . ." (Judge 
16 
Nomian H. Jackson, "Utah Standards of Appellate Review: Revised," 12 Utah Bar 
18,13(1999)) 
Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate is to be read in conjunction with 
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 52(a) states, "Findings of 
fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless 
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial 
court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." (Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a)). 
In interpreting Rule 52, the Utah Supreme Court has held an appellate court 
"will not reverse the findings of fact of a trial court sitting without a jury unless 
they are . . . clearly erroneous." (Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 
1998); citations omitted) The Court of Appeals will review the trial court's 
conclusions of law "for correctness, according the trial court no particular 
deference." (Orton, 970 P.2d at 1256). The "clearly erroneous" standard applies 
whether the case is one in equity or one at law. (Baker vs. Francis, 741 P.2d 548 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987)) If the appellant has not met the marshalling requirement, 
the appellate court is required to affirm that the Findings of Fact are correct, and 
the appeal must fail. (Valcarce vs. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 312 (Utah 1998); see 
also Johnson vs. Higley, 989 P.2d 61, 72 (Utah Ct. App. 1999)). 
Mr. and Mrs. Gomez fail to marshal any of the extensive oral and 
documentary evidence taken at the Temporary Restraining Order hearing, the 
Preliminary Injunction hearing, or at the bench trial in their argument section. 
(Appellants' Brief 3, 6-10) The trial court relied on the testimony, documentary 
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evidence, and pleadings presented at each of these proceedings to make its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (R. 314) However, in lieu of 
marshalling the evidence, Mr. and Mrs. Gomezs' brief first reargues their position 
that the four year statute of limitations bars Ms. Deakin's claims. (Appellant's 
Brief 6-9) The trial court rejected the Gomezs' statute of limitations argument at 
least three times - first, at the Preliminary Injunction hearing (Transcript of 
Preliminary Injunction p. 111-122), second, on Mr. Gomez's Motion to Dismiss 
(R. 54-59, 91-106, 120), and third, at trial (R. 314-325). 
After the trial court entered its initial Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law in April 2005, Mr. and Mrs. Gomez filed a Motion to Amend the Findings of 
Fact for a specific finding to add a paragraph finding that the Statute of 
Limitations defense raised in Defendants' pleadings was denied based upon 
detrimental reliance by Plaintiff. (R. 285) On June 3, 2005, the trial court amended 
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to include a statement on the Statute 
of Limitations commencing to run on October 27, 2004. (R. 320, 321, 324) 
The trial court specifically found Ms. Deakin never heard anything contrary 
to Mr. Gomez's commitment that the property was hers until October 27, 2004 
when Mr. Gomez's real estate agent informed Ms. Deakin he was selling the 
property. (R. 317; Transcript of Preliminary Injunction p. 111-114) This was the 
first action inconsistent with his gift of the property. (R. 317) Mr. Gomez 
admitted that prior to October 27, 2004, he had not informed Ms. Deakin that he 
was going to sell the property. (R. Admitted Facts 319, 320) Mr. Gomez admitted 
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that Ms. Deakin did not receive any notice of legal injury prior to October 27, 
2004. (R. Admitted Facts 319, 320) 
None of these facts appears in the Appellants' argument section to marshal 
the evidence as to why the trial court's findings should be reversed. (Appellant's 
Brief 6-9) Not only do Appellants fail to marshal any evidence as to the findings 
that the statute of limitations began to run on October 27, 2004, but they also do 
not marshal any evidence for their argument that the adverse possession finding 
must be reversed. (Appellant's Brief 10) 
Mr. and Mrs. Gomez simply make a blanket assertion without any citation 
to the record that the trial court erred in finding that Ms. Deakin gained title to the 
property through adverse possession. (Appellant's Brief 10) Mr. and Mrs. Gomez 
ignore the findings and conclusions that Ms. Deakin had actual, adverse, 
exclusive, open, notorious, visible, continuous, and undisturbed possession for a 
period greater than seven years, and she paid for all taxes and improvements to the 
property for the past 28 years. (R. 316-325) Mr. Gomez has not visited the 
property, made any improvements thereto, and he was not aware of any of the 
improvements Ms. Deakin made to the property - especially her changing the 
locks on the doors. (R. 320; see Trail Transcript 55-57) Because Mr. and Mrs. 
Gomez have failed to marshal the evidence, the appellate court is required to 
affirm that the Findings of Fact are correct, and the appeal must fail. (Valcarce vs. 
Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 312 (Utah 1998); see also Johnson vs. Higley, 989 P.2d 
61(UtahCt.App. 1999)). 
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ISSUE No. 2 
TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND AND CONCLUDED THAT THE 
FOUR-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS STARTED TO RUN ON 
OCTOBER 27, 2004, WHEN MS. DEAKIN LEARNED FOR THE FIRST 
TIME IN 28 YEARS THAT MR. GOMES WAS GOING TO SELL THE 
HOUSE AND THUS, TAKE ACTION INCONSISTENT WITH HIS GIFT 
OF THE DUPLEX TO HER. 
The statute of limitations for oral contracts is four years. (TJ.C.A. §78-12-
25) Mr. and Mrs. Gomez argue that the Mr. Gomez entered into an oral contract 
with Ms. Deakin in 1976 and that the statute of limitations ran in 1982 thus, 
barring Ms. Deakin's suit. (Appellant's Brief p. 3, 6) Mr. and Mrs. Gomez assert 
their argument without any citation to the record. Furthermore, Mr. Gomez did 
not own the property in 1976, thus, an oral contract could not have been formed in 
1976, and the statute of limitations could not commence to run in 1976. 
Ms. Deakin counters that the trial court correctly found that statute of 
limitations did not commence to run until October 27, 2004, the date that Mr. 
Gomez's real estate agent abruptly informed Ms. Deakin that Mr. Gomez was 
selling the property. (R. 317; Transcript of Preliminary Injunction p. 111-115) 
Mr. Gomez admitted that prior to October 27, 2004, he had not informed Ms. 
Deakin that he was going to sell the house. (R. Admitted Facts 320) Ms. Deakin 
did not receive any notice of legal injury prior to October 27, 2004. (R. Admitted 
Facts 320) None of these correct and relevant facts appear in the Appellants' 
argument section to marshal the evidence as to why the trial court's findings 
should be reversed. (Appellant's Brief 6-9) 
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Though Mr. and Mrs. Gomez and Ms. Deakin cite different case law in 
their respective briefs, each agree, the statute of limitations begins to mn when the 
last event necessary to complete the cause of action arises. (Spears vs. Warr, 44 
P.3d 742, 753 (Utah 2002); citations omitted) The Supreme Court and this Court 
have articulated exceptions to the last event necessary rale, where, "the discovery 
rule tolls the limitations period until facts forming the basis for the cause of action 
are discovered (Id.) In the case of Spears vs. Warr, the Utah Supreme Court 
stated: 
The discovery rale applies (1) in situations where the 
discovery rale is mandated by statute; (2) in situations 
where a plaintiff does not become aware of the cause 
of action because of the defendant's concealment or 
misleading conduct; and (3) in situations where the 
case presents exceptional circumstances and the 
application of the general rale would be irrational or 
unjust, regardless of any showing that the defendant 
has prevented the discovery of the cause of action. 
Under the discovery rale, the limitations period does 
not begin to ran until the discovery of facts forming 
the basis for the cause of action. 
(Spears vs. Warr, 44 P.3d 742, 753 (Utah 2002); 
citations omitted) 
It is undisputed that the first scenario where the discovery rale is mandated 
by statute is inapplicable to this case. However, the second scenario where a 
plaintiff does not become aware of the cause of action because of the defendant's 
misleading conduct is applicable to this case. 
During the course of their relationship, Ms. Deakin asked Mr. Gomez 
numerous times to have the title of the duplex put in her name as he had promised. 
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(R. 317, See Transcript of Preliminary Injunction Hearing p. 111-115; see also 
Addendum) Each time she followed up with him, Mr. Gomez would say, "I'll get 
around to it, babe, I'll get around to it." (R. 317, see Transcript of Preliminary 
Injunction Hearing p. 111-115; see also Addendum Exhibit 2) Vis. Deakin never 
made such requests in writing because she relied on Mr. Gomez's promise that he 
would get around to putting title in to her name. (R. 317) The parties did not 
consider a formal deed to be essential to completing the gift. (R. 317) 
Ms. Deakin is an unsophisticated, uninformed, and inexperienced person 
when it comes to real estate. (R. 316, see Transcript of Preliminary Injunction 
Hearing p. 111-115; see also Addendum Exhibit 2) For 28 years, Mr. Gomez led 
Ms. Deakin to believe that he had made a gift of the duplex to her. (R. 321; see 
Transcript of Preliminary Injunction Hearing p. 111-115; see also Addendum, 
Exhibit 2) He caused her to rely on his statements that he would get around to 
putting the title of the duplex in her name as he promised. (R. 321, see Transcript 
of Preliminary Injunction Hearing p. 111-115; see also Addendum Exhibit 2) In 
reliance upon Mr. Gomez's assurances, Ms. Deakin continued to act consistently 
with her good faith belief that Mr. Gomez had given her the property by paying 
the mortgage, the taxes, insurance, and for improvements for 28 years. (R. 321) 
It is critical to remember that Mr. Gomez admitted that prior to October 27, 
2004, he had not informed Ms. Deakin that he was going to sell the property. (R. 
Admitted Facts 319, 320) Ms. Deakin did not receive any notice of legal injury 
prior to October 27, 2004. (R. Admitted Facts 319, 320) Again, none of these 
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facts appears in Appellants' argument section. Appellants completely ignore the 
facts - especially their admitted facts. (R. Admitted Facts 319, 320) If the statute 
of limitations was to have run prior to October 27, 2004, it was tolled because Mr. 
Gomez mislead Ms. Deakin and caused her to rely upon his words. 
The third scenario of exceptional circumstances is also applicable to Ms. 
Deakin 5s case, "where the case presents exceptional circumstances and the 
application of the general rule would be irrational or unjust, regardless of any 
showing that the defendant has prevented the discovery of the cause of action." 
(Spears vs. Warr, 44 P.3d 742, 753 (Utah 2002); citations omitted) After 
receiving all the testimony and evidence from the Temporary Restraining Order 
hearing, the Preliminary Injunction hearings, and from the trial, the trial court 
found: 
Based on all of the evidence and the Court's evaluation 
of the demeanor and credibility of Plaintiff and 
Defendant Mr. Gomez on the witness stand, the Court 
further finds based on clear, convincing, and 
unequivocal evidence, that in the context of Defendant 
Mr. Gomez's actions, the extended relationship of the 
parties, the statements made to Plaintiff by Defendant 
Mr. Gomez in April 1977 and thereafter, and 
Plaintiffs consistent behavior for 28 years, Defendant 
did make a gift of the property to the Plaintiff in April 
1977 and the Plaintiff reasonably believed in good 
faith that such a gift had been made, and Plaintiff acted 
in good faith reliance upon that belief. Moreover, 
acting upon her belief that such a gift had been made, 
the Plaintiff made valuable, substantial, and beneficial 
improvements to the property along with paying the 
costs of such improvements and paying the mortgage 
on the property for 28 years. Further, the Court finds, 
that revoking the gift or rescinding the gift at this time 
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would be inequitable to the parties, and specifically to 
Plaintiff who, for 28 years has detrimentally relied 
upon her good faith belief that a gift was made to her 
by Defendant Mr. Gomez. (R. 321-322) 
The trial court correctly found that it would be inequitable, or in other 
words unjust, to revoke or rescind the gift, especially given Ms. Deakin's' 
detrimental reliance and good faith actions for 28 years. (R. 321-322) Thus, if the 
statute of limitations was to have expired prior to October 27, 2004, it was tolled 
because of the exceptional circumstances and the unjust result it would cause. 
The trial court's findings that the statutory period began to run on October 
27, 2004 should be affirmed because Mr. Gomez led Ms. Deakin to believe he 
gifted the house to her, he led her to believe he would transfer title in her name, 
and he caused her to believe that by paying the mortgage, the taxes, and the 
improvements the house was hers. Mr. Gomez admitted that he did not tell Ms. 
Deakin prior to October 27, 2004 that he was going to sell the house. (R. 314-325; 
see Transcript of Preliminary Injunction Hearing 111-115; see also Addendum 
Exhibit 2). Mr. and Mrs. Gomez did not give Ms. Deakin any notice of legal 
injury prior to October 27, 2004. (R. 320) It would be unjust to revoke the gift 
after Ms Deakin has paid the mortgage, the taxes, and all improvements for 28 
years. This Court should affirm the trial court's findings. 
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ISSUE No. 3 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND AND CONCLUDED THAT 
MS. DEAKIN HAD ACTUAL, ADVERSE, EXCLUSIVE, OPEN, 
NOTORIOUS, VISIBLE, CONTINUOUS, AND UNDISTURBED 
POSSESSION FOR A PERIOD OF GREATER THAN SEVEN-YEARS. 
SHE HAS CONTINUOUSLY PAID THE PROPERTY TAXES FOR THE 
PROPERTY FOR 28 YEARS, AND SHE HAS MADE AND PAID FOR ALL 
IMPROVEMENTS TO THE PROPERTY FOR MORE THAN SEVEN 
YEARS. 
Ms. Deakin claims quiet title by adverse possession not founded on a 
written instrument. Mr. and Mrs. Gomez make a blanket statement that "the 
conclusion of law based on adverse possession is unsupported by the facts" 
without marshalling any evidence to support their argument. (Appellants' Brief p. 
10) The record on appeal and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
support the trial court's finding of adverse possession. (R. 314-235) 
A. Elements for Adverse Possession 
Ms. Deakin asserts title by adverse possession not founded on a written 
instrument. One who claims title by adverse possession must bring themselves 
within the statutory provisions. (Jenkins vs. Morgan, 196 P.2d 871 (Utah 1948) 
"Possession of the real property is presumed to be in the legal title holder and that 
occupancy by any other is deemed to be subordinate to that title unless the 
occupant can show that the property has been held and possessed adversely for 
seven-years." (Olwell vs. Clark, 658 P.2d 585, 587 (Utah 1982); U.C.A. §78-12-7) 
"It is widely recognized that in order to show successful adverse possession, the 
claimant must intend to acquire title, must by declaration or conduct give actual or 
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constructive notice to the legal title holder, and must possess the property in a 
manner variously called 'open,' 'notorious,' or 'hostile5 for a period of seven 
years." (Olwell vs. Clark, 658 P.2d 585, 587 (Utah 1982); U.C.A. §78-12-7, 78-
12-10, 78-12-11, 78-12-12) "In order for a claimant to give notice, it must be 
conduct that is inconsistent with the rights of the owner." (Olwell vs. Clark, 658 
P.2d 585, 587 (Utah 1982) The claimant must also have paid all taxes levied 
against the property for seven-years prior to filing the action. (U.C.A. §78-12-12) 
B. Legal Title 
The person establishing legal title to the property is presumed to be the 
owner unless it appears that a person has held and possessed adversely to such 
right for a period of seven-years. (Olwell vs. Clark, 658 P.2d 585, 587 (Utah 
1982); IXCA, §78-12-7) 
In the present case, neither Mr. nor Mrs. Gomez marshaled any evidence 
that they are in fact the legal title holders to 468 E. and 470 E. Sherman Ave., Salt 
Lake City, Utah. (R. 316; see Appellant's Brief 10) In 1977, Mr. Gomez bought 
the duplex located at 468 E. and 470 E. Sherman Ave., Salt Lake City, Utah, as a 
gift for Ms. Deakin (R. 316) In April 1977, Mr. Gomez gave Ms. Deakin the keys 
to the duplex, and he gave her possession and exclusive control of the house. (R. 
316) Ms. Deakin testified that Mr. Gomez told her the house was hers, and she 
could do with it as she chose. (R. 316) When Mr. Gomez gave Ms. Deakin the 
keys, possession, and exclusive control of the duplex, he told her to pay the 
mortgage to the mortgage company, to pay the taxes through the mortgage escrow 
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account, to pay for all of the improvements, to pay for all of the utility bills, and so 
forth. (R. 316) 
Sometime after 1977, Mr. Gomez added his wife, Ramona Gomez, to the 
Certificate of Title. (R. 316) Though Ms. Deakin states that the Certificate of Title 
speaks for itself, neither Mr. nor Mrs. Gomez offered a copy of the Certificate of 
Title or a copy of the Mortgage or any such evidence during any of the hearings or 
at trial proving that they are in fact the recorded titleholders of the property in 
question. (R. 316) Mr. and Mrs. Gomez did not submit any evidence to the trial 
court which would indicate that Mrs. Gomez's name was placed on the title at any 
time or that she ever took any action in the property. (R. 316) 
Ms. Deakin is an unsophisticated, uninformed, and inexperienced person 
when it comes to real estate. (R. 316) Nonetheless, Ms. Deakin asked Mr. Gomez 
numerous times for him to put the title of the duplex in her name as he had 
promised. (R. 317) Each time she followed up with him, Mr. Gomez would say, 
"I'll get around to it, babe, I'll get around to it." (R. 317) Ms. Deakin has relied 
on Mr. Gomez's promise that he would get around to putting title in to her name. 
(R. 317) 
Ms. Deakin has held herself out as the owner of the house. (R. 316-325) 
The trial court received into evidence Ms. Deakin's testimony and copies of 
canceled checks for at least the past 20 years proving her payment of the mortgage 
and taxes. (R. 314-317) At the Preliminary Injunction hearing, Mr. Ed Alio 
testified that Ms. Deakin has always claimed to be the owner of the duplex. (R. 
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316; see also Transcript of Preliminary Injunction Hearing) The clear weight of 
the evidence shows Ms. Deakin has held the property for the past 28 years. (R. 
316-319) 
C. Open, Notorious, Continuous, Adverse, Hostile, Exclusive Possession with 
Notice of Adverse Interests and Improvements (Olwell vs. Clark, 658 P.2d 
585, 587 (Utah 1982)) 
In 1993, Mr. Gomez ended his relationship with Ms. Deakin. (R. 3175 319, 
320) Thus, the elements of hostility, adverseness, open, notorious, exclusive 
possession, and notice of adverse interests commenced. 
Mr. Gomez testified to the following: He did not pay for any of the 
improvements to the house listed above. (R. Admitted Facts 319. 320) He did not 
know that the garages had been torn down within the past ten years. (R. 320; Trial 
Transcript p. 55) He has not paid for, known of, or made any improvements to the 
house for the past ten years. (R. 320, Trial Transcript p. 55) He did not know that 
the locks to the house had been changed. (Trial Transcript p. 55-57) He has not 
visited the property within the past ten years. (R. 320, Trial Transcript p. 55) 
Neither Mr. nor Mrs. Gomez have ever occupied or possessed the duplex. (R. 
Admitted Facts 319) Because Mrs. Gomez did not appear at any of the 
proceedings in this case, it is questionable whether she ever knew of the duplex 
and Mr. Gomez's romantic relationship with Ms. Deakin. 
Mr. and Mrs. Gomez argue that they were not put on notice of an adverse 
interest. (Appellant's Brief p. 10) However, they do not marshal any evidence to 
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support their claim. (Id.) The Utah Supreme Court has set forth the requirement 
that notice, whether actual or constructive, must be given. (Olwell vs. Clark, 658 
P.2d 585, 587 (Utah 1982) "In order for a claimant to give notice, it must be 
conduct that is inconsistent with the rights of the owner." (Olwell at 587) 
Since at least 1993, when Mr. Gomez stopped contacting Ms. Deakin, she 
has taken the following actions: she tore down the garages, she changed the locks, 
new roof, new water/sewer main line, new back porch and railings, new 220 volt 
electrical wiring, new air conditioning units, new water heaters, new light fixtures, 
new ceiling fans, new carpet, several costs of new paint, new storm doors, several 
new stoves, several new refrigerators, and new pipes and drains for clothes 
washers. (R. 318) The trial court received into evidence proof that Ms. Deakin 
paid for these repairs and improvements. (R. 315, 318) Ms. Deakin never 
requested pemiission from Mr. Gomez to do any of these repairs. (R. 318) On one 
occasion, Ms. Deakin did ask Mr. Gomez for financial assistance for a repair, but 
he refused because he told her that the house was hers, and she could do with it as 
she pleased. (R. 318) Ms. Deakin's conduct is clearly inconsistent with the rights 
of Mr. and Mrs. Gomez. She has made significant and substantial changes to and 
improvements to the duplex. Mr. Gomez has been on notice, but neither he nor his 
wife have visited or taken any interest in the property since at least 1993. (R. 320) 
Ms. Deakin's conduct has been inconsistent with the rights and interests of Mr. 
and Mrs. Gomez for more than seven-years. 
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D. Taxes 
The claimant must have paid all taxes levied against the property for seven-
years prior to filing the action. (TJ.C.A. §78-12-12) Mr. Gomez admitted that he 
has never paid any of the property taxes for the duplex. (R. Admitted Facts 319, 
320) Mrs. Gomez also has not paid property taxes for the duplex. (Id.) Ms. 
Deakin has paid the taxes along the mortgage payments for more than seven-years. 
(R. 315-317, 319-324) The copies of all of Ms. Deakin's cancelled checks for the 
past 20-years clearly proves that Ms. Deakin has paid all taxes levied and assessed 
against the property. (R. 314-325; see Transcript to Preliminary Injunction 
Hearing) 
The trial court correctly found and concluded that: 
... the statutory and case law elements for quiet title 
and adverse possession have been met by Plaintiff in 
that she has shown that she was given the property in 
question and thereafter has had actual, adverse, 
exclusive, open, notorious, visible, continuous, and 
undisturbed possession for a period of seven-years or 
greater and that she has continuously paid the property 
taxes on the property during a period exceeding seven-
years, and that she has made and paid for 
improvements to the property. (R. 322) 
For the reasons stated above, the trial court's findings and conclusions 
should be affirmed on the issue of adverse possession. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law. Mr. and Mrs. Gomez failed to marshal the evidence as required by Rule 24 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Thus, Appellant's appeal must fail, and the Findings 
of Fact affirmed. The trial court correctly found in accordance with Mr. Gomez's 
admission that the statute of limitations did not commence to run until October 27, 2004 
when Ms. Deakin learned for the first time that Mr. Gomez intended to sell the duplex. 
The trial court also correctly found and concluded that Ms. Deakin met all of the 
elements of adverse possession, and thus, the trial court quieted title in her. 
June 7, 2006 Respectfully Submitted, 
Christian W. Clinger 
Attorney for Appellee Marjean Deakin 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARJEAN A DEAKIN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BERNARD GOMEZ, 
Defendant 
MINUTES 
TEMP RESTRAIN ORDER 
Case No: 040923578 PR 
Judge: JOHN PAUL KENNEDY 
Date: November 10, 2004 
Clerk: lynm 
PRESENT 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): CHRISTIAN W CLINGER 
Defendant's Attorney(s): JAMES H. DEANS 
Video 
Tape Number: video Tape Count: 12 04 
HEARING 
TAPE: video COUNT: 12 04 
On record counsel only are present to argue plaintiff's Motion for 
a Temp Restraining Order. The court grants the motion for a 
temporary restraining order and a bond must be posted for $15,000 
by the plaintiff within a week. 
The court orders a Preliminary Injunction Hearing on November 22, 
2004 @ 11:00 a.m. 
PRELIM INJUNCTION is scheduled. 
Date: 11/22/2004 
Time: 11: 
Location: 
Before Judge 
00 a.m. 
Third Floor - W35 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
45 0 SOUTH STATE 
SLC, UT 84114-1860 
JOHN PAUL KENNEDY 
Paqe 1 (last) \l rV 
CLINGER LEE CLINGER, LLC 
CHRISTIAN W. CLINGER (8695) 
9117 West 2700 South, Ste. A 
Magna, UT 84044 
Telephone: (801) 250-8200 
Facsimile: (801) 250-8201 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Marjean Deakin 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
MARJEAN A. DEAKIN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BERNARD GOMEZ, 
Defendant 
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING 
ORDER 
Case No.: 040923578 
Judge John Paul Kennedy 
Plaintiff Marjean A. Deakin's Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order pursuant to 
Rule 65A of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure came before this Court on November 10, 2004. 
Christian W. Ginger, counsel for Plaintiff, and James Deans, counsel for Defendant, were 
present. After reviewing the pleadings submitted and after hearing oral argument from 
Plaintiffs counsel and Defendant's counsel, the Court finds that there is substantial harm posed 
to Plaintiff. As such, the Court finds that Plaintiffs Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order 
should be and the same herein granted. 
IT IS HEREBY THE ORDER OF THE COURT THAT, 
1. Defendant Bernard Gomez and his real estate agents, ERA Legacy Realtors, are 
restrained from the following activities: 
By. 
FILE!I DISTRICT COURT 
NOV f 2 m 
S
^ T U K 5 C 0 U N T | w n 
Deputy Clerk 
a. Evicting Plaintiff and Plaintiffs tenant from the duplex located at 468 E. and 470 E. 
Sherman Ave., Salt Lake City, Utah; and, 
b. Entering on, inspecting, and selling the real estate in question located at 468 E. and 
470 E. Sherman Ave., Salt Lake City, Utah; and, 
c. Defendant and his real estate agents, ERA Legacy Realtors, and any prospective 
buyers are restrained from direct contact with the Plaintiff. All communications shall be 
directed through the Parties' attorneys. 
2. Plaintiff is ordered to post a bond in the amount of $15,000.00 with the Court by 5:00 
p.m. on November 18, 2004 as security pursuant to Rule 65 A U.R.C.P. If Plaintiff cannot post 
the bond by November 18, 2004, Plaintiffs counsel is required to inform the Court and opposing 
counsel. 
3. The parties and their attorneys are ordered to appear before this Court on November 
22, 2004 at 11:00 a.m., courtroom W35, Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 450 South State 
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah for a review hearing on the Temporary Restraining Order and a 
determination whether the Temporary Restraining Order shall be rrfade g^^a f t sn t injunction. 
Dated November JjL_> 2 0 0 4 
Approved to form and content: 
The 
Thin 
/ru^ 
Dated: November 11, 2004 
Christian W. Clinger 
Attorney for Plaintiff Marjean Deakin 
/i5a/ed: November f f , 2004 
ST-ames Deans 
Attorney for Defendant Bernard Gomez 
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obviously, expecting the follow-up of a deed. Let's just 
suppose that Ms. Deakin had, as they say — 
THE COURT: Well, not only expecting it, he promised 
that he was going to do that. 
MR. DEANS: At this point in the evidence, that's — 
and that's actually favorable to the statute of limitations. 
Let's make that assumption, because it's unrebutted by 
Mr. Gomez not being here today, Your Honor. I had asked him 
to be and I got a call this morning that he wasn't coming, 
and — 
THE COURT: You're fighting a difficult battle when 
your client doesn't come to respond— 
MR. DEANS: I know. 
THE COURT: — to the allegations, basically, of the 
complaint. 
MR. DEANS: I understand that. 
THE COURT: Let me tell you what I'm concerned 
about. There are a number of theories that I think — legal 
theories that the parties could have in this case. And we're 
early in the case in terms of pleadings, and so they may or 
may not be modified to incorporate all the theories. But just 
listening to the facts that have come in today, one-sided 
primarily facts, admittedly, my concern is you have a client 
who has made a promise that he's going to put a title into her 
name. She's followed up. He says, "I'm going to get around 
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to it. I'll get around to it." And he's reiterated that on 
a number of occasions. 
She is an uninformed, unsophisticated person when it 
comes to real property and taxes, and she's doing what she was 
told that she had to do as a part of this arrangement; and 
that is pay the mortgage payments, pay the improvement 
payments, rent the property, receive the rents, pay all the 
bills indicated, so forth. And so she has, I think in Mr. 
dinger's words, she's detrimentally relied for 28 years on 
the commitment. She never hears anything contrary to that 
commitment until this year, when, all of a sudden, it appears 
that your client no longer is going to do what he told her he 
was going to do. 
And I would assume that he could get around to it 
any time up until the mortgage was paid off, maybe, but he 
hasn't. And now he comes in and says, "I want the property 
back." That's how I see the facts in this case. 
Now, I see another theory as adverse possession. 
She moves in, she's told it's hers; he says, "Okay." She acts 
like it's hers. She does everything that an owner, but again, 
an unsophisticated owner, would do for all these years. And, 
all of a sudden, he comes back and says, "I'm going to sell 
the property and you don't have any right here. You've got 
three days to get out." 
I think you have a very steep hill to climb with 
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those facts to try to maintain your position. I know you've 
got a statute of limitations argument. My concern would be 
that, as far as triggering the statute in the detrimental 
reliance, there's nothing that would trigger it until he says, 
"I'm not going to —you've got to get out." That's the first 
time she knows that he's not going to live up to h e r — his 
promise to her. And that's recent. That's well within the 
statute. 
As far as the adverse possession, I don't see a 
statute running on adverse possession. It's — I mean, she 
has — she has to establish that she was at least seven years 
adverse, open, notorious, paying taxes, which she's been 
doing, either directly or indirectly for that time. So, 
again, I think that's a tough one to argue. 
If you're just going under breach of contract and 
you're proposing that there was some contract that was created 
back in 1977, you may have an argument. But I think the 
arguments on detrimental reliance, which I see being asserted, 
and adverse possession, which I see being asserted are — are 
possible arguments. 
I think there's another theory that I haven't heard 
yet except maybe indirectly with some of the references, and 
that's fraud. That he fraudulently told her, "I'm going to 
give this to you. You make the payments." And then he sits 
back and he waits for 25 — 27 years, whatever it is, and then 
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he comes m and says, "Now I'm going to take the property 
back And I didn't give you the deed Too bad." You know9 
So I think there's-- there's some pretty heavy causes of 
action that the plaintiff has here that I think make it 
difficult for you, without evidence and with your client not 
being here, to — to resist at least the preliminary 
injunction. 
Now, as far as — as far as the security is 
concerned, I'm not — I mean, if we look at damages m this 
case and who's going to suffer the irreparable damage, on the 
plaintiff's side, it seems to me that she's got all of the 
issues regarding "I've been relying on the fact that I'm the 
owner for all these years and now I'm going to be thrown out 
on the street," and I think those are legitimate irreparable 
damages. 
His irreparable damages might be that he would lose 
the opportunity t o — to sell. We know there's a buyer out 
there who wants to buy the property, but, on the other hand, 
there's been a number of —been a lot of interest shown m the 
property. And so I don't think it's clear to me that — that 
this has been the only — the only buyer that is going to come 
down the aisle. It may be that he is, but there's no evidence 
that that would be the case at this point. 
Other than that, his damages would be financial, 
which I don't see as irreparable. She would have some 
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irreparable damages if she proves her theories — I mean have 
some monetary damages, just like he would have monetary 
damages. So in terms of weighing those issues, I don't — I 
don't see it tipping towards your client's side, and as far as 
security's concerned, you may want to address that. But I 
think my inclination at this point would be to — to either 
order a very nominal amount of security or none at all. 
So with my having said that, if you could address 
those issues and let me know what you think I should be 
thinking about — 
MR. DEANS: All right. 
THE COURT: — in trying to decide those questions. 
MR. DEANS: Hopefully, I can do it with my own 
gallows, Your Honor, but I'll do my best to respond to your — 
THE COURT: You're very capable and I know, if 
anybody could respond, you can. 
MR. DEANS: And I would respond in the most 
respectful way that I think you've stated the problems with 
the case. 
I developed a sick feeling in my stomach when I came 
into work and my secretary says, "Mr. Gomez called and he's 
not coming." That's obvious and I — but, doggone it, I'm 
going to come here and do my best for a client, whether I — 
THE COURT: And you've done very well. I think your 
questioning has been good, your arguments have been excellent. 
115 
Exhibit 3 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARJEAN A DEAKIN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BERNARD GOMEZ, 
Defendant 
MINUTES 
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
Case No: 040923578 PR 
Judge: JOHN PAUL KENNEDY 
Date: November 22, 2004 
Clerk: marcyt 
PRESENT 
Plaintiff (s) : MARJEAN A DEAKIN 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): CHRISTIAN W CLINGER 
Defendant's Attorney(s): JAMES H. DEANS 
Video 
Tape Number: 11:06 
HEARING 
TAPE: 11:06 The above-entitled case comes before the Court for 
hearing on the temporary restraining order. The Court hears an 
opening statement from counsel for plaintiff. 
TAPE: 11:08 Marjean A. Deakin is sworn and examined. 
TAPE: 12:26 Edward J. Aho is sworn and examined. 
TAPE: 12:36 Plaintiff rests. Defendant calls Jill Johnson who is 
sworn and examined. 
TAPE: 1:01 Defendant rests. Both sides rest. The case is argued 
to the Court by respective counsel and submitted. 
TAPE: 1:20 Based on the evidence and argument of counsel, the Court 
grants the preliminary injunction. Plaintiff shall file a bond in 
the amount of $1500 of the injunction shall be resolved. 
Case No: 040923578 
Date: Nov 22, 2 0 04 
This case is set for a one day bench trial on January 28, 2005 at 
9:00 a.m. 
BENCH TRIAL is scheduled. 
Date: 01/28/2005 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: Third Floor - W35 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
450 SOUTH STATE 
SLC, UT 84114-1860 
Before Judge: JOHN PAUL KENNEDY 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARJEAN A. DEAKIN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BERNARD GOMEZ, 
Defendant. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Case No. 040923578 
Honorable JOHN PAUL KENNEDY 
Court Clerk: Marcy Thorne 
January 3, 2005 
The a b o v e - e n t i t l e d c a s e comes b e f o r e t h e Cour t p u r s u a n t t o 
Rule 4-501 of t h e Utah Code of J u d i c i a l A d m i n i s t r a t i o n . 
S p e c i f i c a l l y , D e f e n d a n t ' s Motion t o Dismiss has been s u b m i t t e d f o r 
d e c i s i o n . 
Based upon t h e a rguments of t h e p a r t i e s , t h e documents i n t h e 
f i l e and t h e t e s t i m o n y a t t h e P r e l i m i n a r y I n j u n c t i o n h e a r i n g , 
D e f e n d a n t ' s mot ion i s d e n i e d w i t h o u t p r e j u d i c e . 
DATED t h i s 3 r d day of J a n u a r y , 2005. 
BY THE COURT, 
u_ 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 040923578 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail 
Mail 
& 
Dated this 
T^-
day of 
CHRISTIAN W CLINGER 
ATTORNEY PLA 
9117 W 2700 S STE A 
MAGNA, UT 84 044 
JAMES H. DEANS 
ATTORNEY DEF 
440 South 700 East 
Suite 101 
SLC UT 84102-0000 
20 (7$ 
^\ 
Deputy Court CJerk 
r^  -.— ^ l^v t 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - WV DEPT. COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARJEAN A DEAKIN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BERNARD GOMEZ, 
Defendant 
COURT RULING 
Case No: 050100573 
Judge: JOHN PAUL KENNEDY 
Date: 06/03/2005 
Clerk: deniseo 
It is hereby ordered, adjudged, and decreed that title in and of 
the property described below is bereby quieted in and to MARJEAN A 
DEAKIN, subject to any mortgage ixisting on the property as of the 
date hereof and further subject to any valid lien of any thrd 
party, but free and clear of any claim by Bernard Gomez and/or 
Ramona Gomez: 
Paae 1 (last) 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT /^#^5 
MARJEAN A. DEAKIN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BERNARD GOMEZ AND RAMONA GOMEZ| 
Defendants. 
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 
QUIETING TITLE IN PLAINTIFF 
Case No.: 050100573 
Judge John Paul Kennedy 
The above referenced case came before the Court for a bench trial on February 25, 2005. 
Present at trial was Plaintiff Marjean A. Deakin (hereinafter referred to as "Plaintiff) 
represented by and through her counsel, Christian W. Clinger, and Defendant Bernard Gomez 
(hereinafter referred to as Defendant Mr. Gomez), represented by his attorney, James Deans. 
Defendant Ramona Gomez (Mr. Gomez's wife) failed to appear at any of the hearings or the 
trial, but was properly a party to this action and was represented by Mr. Gomez's counsel. 
Hearings on Plaintiffs motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction were 
held in November and December 2004. The evidence admitted therein was stipulated to be 
admitted for the purpose of the bench trial. After the initial issuance of the Court's Findings, 
Conclusions, and Order in April 2005, Defendants moved that an amendement be made thereto 
addressing Defendants' statute of limitations contentions. Argument on the Defendants' motion 
was heard on June 3, 2005. These Amended Findings, Conclusions, and Order are issued in 
response thereto. 
The Court has heard and received the parties' stipulations of fact, the testimony of 
various witnesses for the Plaintiff and the Defendants and has received into evidence the 
following exhibits from the parties: 
Plaintiffs Exhibits and Evidence 
1. Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Love letter and pictures from Defendant to Plaintiff 
2. Plaintiffs Exhibit 2, Love letter and pictures from Defendant to Plaintiff 
3. Plaintiffs Exhibit 3, pictures of Plaintiff on car given by Defendant 
4. Plaintiffs Exhibit 4, Notarized letter from Defendant transferring car to Plaintiff 
5. Plaintiffs Exhibit 5, copies of cancel checks evidencing mortgage payments from 1980 to 
2004 
6. Plaintiffs Exhibit 6, Mortgage statement showing balance 
7. Plaintiffs Exhibit 7, Receipt and payment for new water main line 
8. Plaintiffs Exhibit 8, compilation of receipts for repairs and improvements to the duplex paid 
for by Plaintiff 
9. Plaintiffs Exhibit 9, November 2004 Eviction Notice 
10. Plaintiffs Exhibit 10, copy of October/November 2004 mortgage payment 
11. Plaintiffs Exhibit 11, Notice to show house 
12. Plaintiffs Exhibit 12, copy of lease from Plaintiff 
13. Plaintiffs Exhibit 13, copy of lease between Plaintiff and Tralaye Procelle 
14. Plaintiffs Exhibit 14 copy of audiotape of messages left on Tralaye Procelle's voicemail at 
work and at home, produced with these Initial Disclosures. 
15. Plaintiffs Copies of checks to Mortgage company for December 2004 mortgage and tax 
payment, January 2005 mortgage and tax payment, and February 2005 mortgage and tax 
payment. 
Defendant's Exhibits and Evidence 
1. Defendant's Exhibit 4, part of Mr. Gomez's 2001, 2002, and 2003 tax returns 
2. Defendant's Exhibit 5, 1984 receipt from Chris & Dick's 
3. Defendant's Exhibit 6, receipt for nails 
Based upon the parties' stipulations, testimony, and the evidence received, the Court now 
enters the following Findings of Fact: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. In April 1977, Defendant Bernard Gomez bought the duplex located at 468 E. and 470 
E. Sherman Ave, Salt Lake City, Utah, as a gift for Plaintiff Deakin. Mr. Gomez asserted that at 
an uncertain date sometime after April 1977, he added his wife's name to the title. Though 
Plaintiff agrees that the Certificate of Title speaks for itself as to the names thereon, neither a 
copy of the Certificate of Title nor the Mortgage was offered into evidence by the Defendants as 
evidence that Mrs. Gomez's name was added to the title to the property in question. While no 
evidence was introduced on this point, Mrs. Gomez appeared in this case as a party defendant 
and was represented by counsel. There was no evidence submitted which would indicate that 
Mrs. Gomez's name was placed on the title at any time materially prior to the filing of this 
action, nor was any evidence submitted which would indicate that Mrs. Gomez ever took any 
actions of her own which were contrary to the actions of her husband in this matter. 
2. In April 1977, Mr. Gomez gave Plaintiff the keys to the duplex and gave her 
possession and exclusive control of the house. Based on the testimony of Plaintiff, Defendant 
Mr. Gomez told her the house was hers and she could do with it as she chose. Plaintiff has never 
filed a Notice of Interest with the Salt Lake County Recorder since 1977. Plaintiff did file and 
record a Lis Pendis Notice and an Amended Lis Pendis Notice with the Salt Lake County 
Recorder on November 8, 2004, at the same time she commenced this lawsuit. 
3. Plaintiff Deakin has continuously resided and occupied the premises located at 468 E. 
Sherman Ave., Salt Lake City, Utah (hereinafter "the property"), since 1977. Since 1977, she has 
openly claimed that the duplex was hers. She has told people and held out to the public that she 
was the owner of the house. Plaintiffs brother, Ed Aho, testified at the Preliminary Injunction 
Hearing that Plaintiff has always believed that the duplex was hers, and she has always claimed 
to be the owner. Defendants have never occupied the premises. 
4. In 1977, when Defendant Mr. Gomez gave the keys, possession, and exclusive 
control of the duplex to Plaintiff Deakin, he told her to pay the mortgage on the duplex to the 
mortgage company, pay the taxes through the mortgage escrow account, pay for all of the 
improvements, pay for all of the utility bills, and so forth. Plaintiff is an unsophisticated, 
uninformed, and inexperienced person when it comes to real estate and taxes. There is no 
evidence that she was represented by counsel with respect to this property until this action was 
commenced. Plaintiff has never claimed any deductions for the payment of property taxes or 
interest on her tax returns since 1977. Plaintiff has never reported any rental income from the 
duplex on her tax returns since 1977. 
5. Nonetheless, for 28 years Plaintiff has paid the mortgage, paid the taxes, paid for all of 
the improvements, and paid the utility bills. Plaintiff has detrimentally relied on Mr. Gomez's 
commitment for 28 years. The Court received into evidence copies of checks for at least 20 
years proving payment of the mortgage. In regard to the monies Plaintiff has received on the 
property, Plaintiff has never sent the Defendants any monies she has collected for rent on the 
duplex. All monies have gone to the Plaintiff. Plaintiff has never sent the Defendants any 
accounting for the monies collected at the duplex. 
For 28 years, Defendants have never asked Plaintiff to send them any of the monies from 
the duplex. Furthermore, the Defendants have never asked Plaintiff for any accounting. 
6. For 28 years, Plaintiff has acted consistently with her position as owner of the 
property in regard to her paying the mortgage, the taxes, and the improvements. 
7. Plaintiff has asked Mr. Gomez numerous times for him to put the title of the duplex in 
her name as he promised. Plaintiff has followed up with Mr. Gomez in regard to putting the title 
in her name, and he has responded to her, "I'll get around to it, Babe; I'll get around to it." 
Plaintiff has never requested in writing that the Defendants send her a deed conveying ownership 
to her. Plaintiff has never sent the Defendants any proposed deed for them to sign conveying the 
property to Plaintiff. The reason Plaintiff never requested in writing for such a deed was that she 
relied on Mr. Gomez's promises that he would get around to putting the title in Plaintiffs name. 
No evidence was presented which would indicate that the parties regarded the conveyance of a 
formal deed to be essential to completing the gift of the property or anything more than a mere 
formality. In fact, the actions of the parties indicated to the contrary. 
8. Mr. Gomez stopped contacting Plaintiff in about 1993. Plaintiff had not heard 
anything contrary to Mr. Gomez's commitment until Mr. Gomez abruptly informed her through 
a real estate agent on October 27, 2004, that he was planning to sell the duplex, implicitly 
indicating for the first time to Plaintiff that he was taking action inconsistent with the gift. On 
that date, for the first time, Defendant Mr. Gomez, through his agent, stated he wanted the 
property back. 
1 I — 
9. Plaintiff has made the following improvements to the property: new roof, new 
water/sewer main line, new back porch and railings for 468 E., new porch railings for 470 E., 
torn down the garages for 468 E. and 470 E., new 220 volt electrical wiring for 468 E. and 470 
E., new air conditioning units for 468 E. and 470 E., new water heaters for 468 E. and 470 E., 
new light fixtures and ceiling fans for 468 E. and 470 E., new carpet for 468 E. and 470 E., 
several coats of new paint for 468 E. and 470 E., new storm doors for 468 E. and 470 E., 2 
stoves and 2 refrigerators for 470 E., 2 stoves and 3 refrigerators for 468 E., and new pipes and 
drains for clothes washers in 468 E. and 470 E. The Court received into evidence copies of 
receipts and proof of payment of many of the improvements listed above. 
Plaintiff never requested orally or in writing permission to do any repairs. This was 
because she primarily relied on Mr. Gomez's statements that, because the property was hers, she 
was responsible for all improvements, repairs, and the payments therefor. When Ms. Deakin did 
ask on one occasion for Mr. Gomez to provide some financial help to pay for repairs or 
improvements, it was her testimony that he refused because he told her that it was her house and 
she could do with it as she pleased. Furthermore, in regard to tearing down the garages, the 
notices from Salt Lake City and Salt Lake County to tear down the garages came to Plaintiff and 
not to Mr. Gomez. 
10. On October 27, 2004, Plaintiff learned for the first time through Mr. Gomez's real 
estate agent that he was planning to sell the duplex in question. 
10. Plaintiff- not the Defendants - has rented the other side of the duplex for at least 
the past 28 years. Plaintiff is currently in a lease with Tralaye Procelle. 
11. On November 22, 2004, two weeks after this action was filed, Ms. Procelle received 
several telephone messages from Mr. Gomez and his daughter. They both instructed Ms. 
Procelle to send her monthly rental payment to Mr. Gomez and not to pay Plaintiff. There was 
no evidence that such a request had been submitted to this or to any other tenant prior to 
November 22, 2004. 
DEFENDANT HAS ADMITTED THE FOLLOWING FACTS THROUGH HIS ANSWER 
AND ADMISSIONS: 
12. In 1973, Plaintiff met the Defendant, Bernard Gomez, in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
13. In 1976, Mr. Gomez had talked a lot about improving Plaintiffs living conditions 
and getting her out of her rental apartment. He wanted Plaintiff to have a better quality of life. 
14. Mr. Gomez admitted that from 1977 to the present, there has never been any 
understanding or conversation between him and Plaintiff that Plaintiff was in a lease agreement 
with Mr. Gomez for the duplex in question. 
15. Mr. Gomez admitted that he has never had a lease agreement from 1977 to the 
present with any tenant in 470 E. Sherman Ave. 
16. Mr. Gomez admitted that he has never personally collected any rent from the duplex. 
17. Mr. Gomez admitted that he has never paid any of the property taxes for the duplex 
in question. 
18. Mr. Gomez admitted that for at least the past ten years the monthly mortgage 
invoices and tax notices have been sent to 468 E. Sherman Ave. 
19. Mr. Gomez admitted that he has never paid for any of the following improvements or 
repairs: new roof, new water/sewer main line, new back porch and railings for 468 E., new porch 
railings for 470 E., torn down the garages for 468 E. and 470 E., new 220 volt electrical wiring 
for 468 E. and 470 E., new air conditioning units for 468 E. and 470 E., new water heaters for 
468 E. and 470 E., new light fixtures and ceiling fans for 468 E. and 470 E., new carpet for 468 
E. and 470 E., several coats of new paint for 468 E. and 470 E., new storm doors for 468 E. and 
470 E., 2 stoves and 2 refrigerators for 470 E., 2 stoves and 3 refrigerators for 468 E., and new 
pipes and drains for clothes washers in 468 E. and 470 E. 
20. From 1993 to the present, Plaintiff has not seen Mr. Gomez. They have had very 
limited telephone contact. 
21. Prior to the commencement of this action, the monthly mortgage invoices and the 
annual payment and interest notices were mailed to 468 E. Sherman Ave. 
22. Neither Mr. Gomez nor Mrs. Gomez have ever lived in or occupied the duplex. 
23. For nearly 28 years, Plaintiff has leased 470 E. Sherman Ave. without any restraint 
or objections from Mr. Gomez or Mrs. Gomez. 
n 1 At 
24. Plaintiff has never been required to send Mr. Gomez the rent collected from 470 E. 
Sherman, and during the past 28 years, Mr. Gomez has not asked for the rent. 
25. Mr. Gomez admitted that prior to October 27, 2004, he had not informed Plaintiff 
that he was going to sell the house. Plaintiff did not receive any notice of legal injury prior to 
October 27, 2004. 
TESTIMONY RECEIVED 
26. Though Mr. Gomez testified that he had paid two or three monthly mortgage 
payments over 28 years, he did not remember specifically when those payments may have been 
made and he did not offer any documentary evidence of proof of such payments or their timing. 
27. Mr. Gomez testified that neither he nor Mrs. Gomez has ever paid the property taxes 
on the duplex. 
28. In regard to Mr. Gomez's tax returns, Mr. Gomez testified that he has never 
collected any rent from the property. However, he did report some rental income on his taxes 
(for the years 2001-2004), though he did not know the monthly rental amount collected. He 
merely estimated what he thought the rental income was and then reported it on those tax 
returns. No tax return evidence, however, tied the income reported therein to the property in this 
case. 
29. In regard to improvements made to the property, Mr. Gomez testified that he has not 
made or paid for any improvements to the property during at least the last ten years. He also 
testified that he did not know of the improvements made by Plaintiff during at least the past ten 
years because he has not visited the property during that time. 
30. Mr. Gomez did testify that sometime in 1984 he made repairs to the roof of the 
duplex and he offered two receipts which were received into evidence. However, the receipts do 
not identify Mr. Gomez's name and there is no proof of payment. Only one of the receipts even 
refers to the property's address, but the telephone number on that receipt is not that of 
Defendant. 
31. Prior to April 1977, and continuing thereafter until sometime prior to 1993, Plaintiff 
and Defendant engaged in a prolonged romantic relationship. During that relationship, Mr. 
Gomez gave Plaintiff a number of expensive gifts, including two automobiles and a ring. In 
*"\r\ 
view of the fact that the gift of the duplex was subject to a mortgage, the value of that gift was 
not out of proportion to the value of the other gifts given by the Defendant Mr. Gomez to the 
Plaintiff 
32. In April 1977, Defendant's prior statements and prior and continuing actions led 
Plaintiff to believe that Defendant had also made a gift of the real property at issue in this case 
to Plaintiff, and Plaintiff acted in detrimental reliance upon those statements and actions, 
reasonably believing that the property was her own property commencing in April 1977. 
33. Since April 1977 Plaintiff acted consistent with her good faith belief that the 
Defendant had given the property to her. Nothing in Defendants' actions until October 2004 
would be contrary to such belief. 
34. For 28 years, because she believed in good faith that the Defendant had given the 
property to her, Plaintiff paid the mortgage, the taxes, other bills, and the costs of the 
improvements on the property. 
35. Acting in reasonable reliance upon Defendant's statement that he would "get 
around to" putting title in Plaintiffs name, Plaintiff never requested in writing that the 
Defendant send her a deed conveying ownership to her. In further reliance upon that assurance, 
Plaintiff continued to act consistently with her good faith belief that the property had been given 
to her by paying the mortgage, taxes, insurance, for improvements, etc. 
36. Based upon all the evidence and the Court's evaluation of the demeanor and 
credibility of Plaintiff and Defendant Mr. Gomez on the witness stand, the Court further finds 
based on clear, convincing, and unequivocal evidence, that in the context of Defendant Mr. 
Gomez's actions, the extended relationship of the parties, the statements made to Plaintiff by 
Defendant Mr. Gomez in April 1977 and thereafter, and Plaintiffs consistent behavior for 28 
years, Defendant did make a gift of the property to the Plaintiff in April 1977 and the Plaintiff 
reasonably believed in good faith that such a gift had been made, and Plaintiff acted in good 
faith reliance upon that belief. Moreover, in acting upon her belief that such a gift had been 
made, the Plaintiff made valuable, substantial, and beneficial improvements to the property 
along with paying the costs of such improvements and paying the mortgage on the property for 
28 years. 
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37. Further, the Court finds that revoking the gift or rescinding the gift at this time would 
be inequitable to the parties, and specifically to Plaintiff who, for 28 years, has detrimentally 
relied upon her good faith belief that a gift was made to her by Defendant Mr. Gomez. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based on the Findings of Fact as stated above, the Court now enters the following 
Conclusions of Law. 
Plaintiff has specifically alleged the following six causes of action: 1. Quiet 
Title/Adverse Possession pursuant to U.C.A. 78-25-5 through 14 and U.C.A. 78-40-1 et seq.; 2. 
In the Alternative, Unjust Enrichment pursuant to the Utah Occupying Claimant Act, U.C.A. 57-
6-1 et seq.; 3. Detrimental Reliance/Promissory Estoppel; 4. Fraud; 5. Interference with 
Contract; and 6. Violation and Contempt of Court. Because the Court concludes that Plaintiff 
has prevailed on her first and third causes of action, as indicated below, it is not necessary to 
address the other causes of action. 
As set forth below, the statutory and case law elements for quiet title and adverse 
possession have been met by Plaintiff in that she has shown that she was given the property in 
question and thereafter has had actual, adverse, exclusive, open, notorious, visible, continuous, 
and undisturbed possession for a period of seven years or greater and that she has continuously 
paid the property taxes on the property during a period exceeding seven years, and that she has 
made and paid for improvements to the property. 
1. Since 1977 to the present date, Plaintiff Deakin has paid substantially all mortgage 
payments, paid all taxes, and made and paid for substantially all improvements and 
repairs to the duplex located at 468 E. and 470 E. Sherman Ave., Salt Lake City, Utah. 
2. Defendants have never paid taxes for the property or made or paid for any repairs or 
improvements for at least the past 10 years. 
3. Defendant Mr. Gomez intended to give and indeed did make a gift of the property to the 
Plaintiff in April 1977. The actions of the parties with respect to each other and with 
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respect to the property since that date until October 2004 are entncly consistent with such 
gift and those actions would remove the transaction from the Statute of Frauds. 
4. With respect to Defendants and all others, Plaintiff has had actual, adverse, exclusive, 
open, notorious, visible, continuous, and undisturbed possession of 468 E. and 470 E. 
Sherman Ave., Salt Lake City, Utah for at least the past 10 years. 
5. Mr. and Mrs. Gomez have never possessed or exclusively occupied the premises in 
question. 
6. Ms. Deakin and Defendants have never been in a lease agreement for the premises in 
question. 
7. Defendant Mr. Gomez initially purchased the property so he could make a gift of the 
property to Plaintiff. In April 1977, before changing title to the property, Defendant Mr. 
Gomez in fact gave the property to Plaintiff. As between Mr. Gomez and Ms. Deakin, 
the following matters, established by clear, convincing, and unequivocal evidence, 
constituted the elements of the gift: Mr. Gomez expressed his intent to give the property 
to Plaintiff, he delivered the gift by presenting to her the keys to and exclusive possession 
and control of the premises, and she accepted the keys and took exclusive possession and 
control of the property. These facts occurred in April 1977. Plaintiff believed that the 
gift occurred at that time based upon those events. Thereafter, the conduct of the parties 
over 28 years reaffirmed that the gift had occurred when Mr. Gomez advised the Plaintiff 
that the property was hers and when he continuously acquiesced in her on-going actions 
wherein she performed consistently with the occurrence of the gift by paying the 
mortgage, insurance, and taxes, collecting and keeping the rents, dealing with tenants and 
the City, and arranging for and paying for significant improvements and maintenance of 
the property. 
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8. At all relevant times since April 1977, Plaintiff has understood in good faith reliance 
upon the statements and actions of Defendant Mr. Gomez that she was the owner of the 
duplex that Mr. Gomez gave her. 
9. Because Plaintiff was given the duplex located at 468 E. and 470 E. Sherman Ave., Salt 
Lake City, Utah, and because she has had exclusive, continuous, open, notorious, and 
adverse possession since 1977, and because she has paid all taxes and mortgage 
payments and because she has made substantial valuable improvements to the property, 
the Court concludes she is entitled under the doctrine of adverse possession to an Order 
quieting title to the property in question in her, subject to any existing mortgage balance 
and subject to any valid third-party lien. Neither Mr. Gomez nor anyone else ever took 
any action which would constitute conduct which contradicted or breached the intent to 
make a gift of the property until October 2004. Hence, no statute of limitations began to 
run against Plaintiff until that time. Because Defendants took no action contrary to 
Plaintiffs interest until October 2004, Plaintiffs continuing belief that Defendants would 
not attempt to revoke the gift was justified until October 2004. Plaintiff timely filed this 
action immediately thereafter. 
10. Defendants are equitably estopped from any action to revoke the gift and from taking any 
action which may be inconsistent with said gift. 
11. The Court concludes that Ms. Deakin is the prevailing party. As such, she is entitled to 
have the title in the said property quieted in her name and also to receive an award of her 
costs in this action pursuant to Rule 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In view of 
the fact that no deed was recorded in favor of Plaintiff Deakin, her right and interest in 
and to the said property is subject to the existing first mortgage and any other valid lien 
of a third party. No evidence of any such third-party lien was presented at the trial. Ms. 
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Deakm and her attorney are to prepare an affidavit of costs and suomit it to the Court and 
opposing counsel pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
12 The Court concludes that because Ms Deakm has prevailed on the merits of her case, the 
$1,000 00 cash bond that she deposited with the Third District Court, Salt Lake City 
Department, in conjunction with the Preliminary Injunction Order, shall be released to 
her 
13 No award of attorneys' fees is made at this time 
ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, that title in and to the 
property described below is hereby quieted m and to MARJEAN A DEAKIN, subject to any 
mortgage existing on the property as of the date hereof and further subject to any valid lien of 
any third party, but free and clear of any claim by Bernard Gomez and/or Ramona Gomez 
Lots 53, and 54, Block 2, WASHINGTON PLACE, a subdivision of Lots 12, 
and 13, Five Acre Plat "A", A Big Field Survey, 
Together with Vi of the vacated alley abutting on the South and East. 
Tax ID No. 16-07-460-013 
Commonly known as 468-470 East Sherman Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84115. 
Dated June a 2005 
T ^ ul Kennedy * L/ ' A? 
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